There just isn't a whole lot of room for Euroscepticism to breathe.
As I have written repeatedly: Euroscepticism lives on the (far) right and (far) left, very rarely in the center, of anything, and this is due to the paradigm-arrogance of the architects of EU, and the redefinition of old aspects of the political spectrum.
|The ironically named Sahra Wagenknecht, whose Linke party has endeared her somewhat to the political circles in Germany, in spite of the whacky things she sometimes says|
Nowhere is this dichotomy more unbridgeable than in the current composition of the Bundesrat and Bundestag (Upper and Lower houses, respectively) of German Parliament.
The Bundesrat is only symbolically an upper house. German law doesn't divide these houses, as upper or lower. It isn't like the US, or UK. It is a house assembled by local governments, and party politics tend to result in a "less debate more back door" resolution status. Support here is almost guaranteed if the move gained traction in the Bundestag.
If we wish Euroscepticism to affect the type of schisms holding the issues and their policymakers in EU, and its failures of everyday Europeans, then we need to strike a blow against EU within the nation of its origin: Germany. But German politics may be the most complex in the world. The coalitions between majority parties and other majority parties, and their coalitions with any single, or bloc of minority parties can hold for years, or split in midterm and suddenly, and either way this makes changes very difficult to achieve.
Parties in which Euroscepticism thrives in Germany are few in number, and tend to be lead by these iconically polarizing figures. They are the left wing Die Linke (the left, in German), and the far-right Alternative fur Deutschland, and the heavily linked to SDP, the Dem Party of Bavaria, which, unless the issue of Germexit can be combined with Bavarian secession from Germany, you may as well count them out.
The Door Keepers
A smaller majority party holds an angle of power that makes or breaks the direction of any majority coalition. Die Linke, the far left party, and the Greens Alliance 90 on the center left are the current door holders in the Bundestag.
So, in spite of the fact that they are both majority parties, both Die Linke, and The Green Alliance 90, due to their low numbers seats, act like larger minority parties.
So, as you can already guess, this is not a large number. It is around 8%-10% of the vote which they tend to accomplish respectively, on a good day, and this is not paralyzing enough in the Bundestag to break-up the permissive coalition assembled by Frau Merkel, and which continues to beat like wings that guide both Germany as well as EU towards an uncertain future.
But there are ways, described very generally here, but this is possible.
The Gate Holders
The gate-holders in German Parliamentary procedure are the minority parties whom must contribute their seats to an issue, or it doesn't pass. These can change with the issues, as well. The coalition's platform can shift, as well.
But these are normally your center right, such as the German Family Party, and your center left, like the Pirate Party of Germany.
|Herr Schiffer, and his German wing of the International Pirate Party. You'd have to hope that having this name guarantees their resistance to EU. But then I would dash those hopes...sorry|
Bigger left parties, such as the Greens 90's Alliance do not necessarily hold the gate, but normally will be allied with one or more which does, but their pro EU position isn't really ever going to change. And likewise, there will be room for Die Linke to form Eurosceptic coalition. Thus the objection to halt referendum is going to carry by the larger majority coalition, which does not include Die Linke. Although this would not be a permanent halt to any referendum, it will indeed be a part of any motion, but let's illustrate a possible way to get to this point. Thus we are going to examine this issue as if the smaller parties alone held the keys to the changes which need to occur.
If, for instance, the Link (Die Linke), which is a majority party, could assemble in roads to referendum, and blocked more pressing issues, such as a military budget, then its controversial leader, Sahra Wagenknecht, could throw more weight via compromise with another traditionally allied minority party. This would not bring enough votes for referendum, but it could effectively thwart the typically allied CDU (Merkel) and SDP union, which has held both front doors on right, and left, as well as controlled the minority and bloc coalitions of minority parties for a historic amount of time. Parties that may be seeking a change in Germany are assembling towards the center left and center right, and Wagenknecht could begin the work one way, and need to finish it another.
In order to break the coalition bearing Merkel's hold on "no referendum", for good, Die Linke needs to maintain its seats, as well as increase the issues bearing against Merkel's EU from a grass roots level, such as TV ads shedding light on the immigration issue. Die Linke should also campaign for a stronger presence in the Bundesrat via more regional electoral presence, since the upper house is by appointed delagatory mission from governments of each of the 16 Lander (States). But, the drawbacks to dealing with the Linke are many, to include Wagenknecht's inane declarations which called for the end of the domination of the white race in Europe. Allying with Die Linke for a sane cause may be politically riding the tiger.
Ousting Merkel: Nuclear Option
Aside from an example using a smaller majority partner to ally blocs with the gatekeepers against Merkel's policies, an attempt could be made at deadlocking Parliament. In UK, this is a fairly often occurrence. But in Germany it is a bit more difficult to accomplish, but not impossible. Typically, the issue of economy is the one deadlocking Parliament, and it happens historically every ten years or so. But one requiring a new chancellor has never happened like the type needed to oust Merkel. This would mean political suicide, and quite possibly the destruction of a party in one of several possible ways; so it will never happen.
Building the Bridge With AfD
The fact that the two most extreme parties must unite, and either approach the gatekeeper coalition(s), or hold enough seats to get the referendum to the debate floor and not take "nein" for an answer, is just about a foregone conclusion. The inherent difficulties which both see in the other would require a good bit of on-the-record strategy sessions to work out. And both parties would need to begin to put feelers out, including paid-for polls which could be entered upon the debate floor in both houses to provide proof that the motion has real public support.
But legally, before this can occur, the AfD party must belong to an already established minority coalition, and, that coalition must, in turn, hold seats voting with at least the junior partner in one of the two largest parties whom have coalesced. This does not restrict platform, but the point of order was created in order to cause a kind of apprenticeship. And the platform must survive this era in order to continue forward.
Thus, the implied "shift further right" prediction of AfD by the mainstream press since the prelim loss last month (April 2017) has no bearing on the realities of EU exit, nor on the difficulties that AfD would need to address in order to gain enough traction to carry the motion to the debate floor enough times to either deadlock over the issue, and use referendum to break the deadlock, as in UK, or continue to keep the issue on the forefront of political intrigue by uniting with Die Linke, or elements thereof, to turn ALL the tumblers in minority session in order to align a bigger, and better referendum monster. Because AfD is currently suffering the slander of the Bilderberger-controlled media, it would be wise to identify individuals in Die Bild or Der Spiegel, for example, whose stories don't always tow the Globalist agenda.
Right away, in back door meetings, analysts should be providing the Eurosceptic coalition with the parties whose agendas will invariably collide with either AfD or Die Linke's, or with individuals within the six or so center left and center right minority parties, and select the people carefully from these parties whose debate will reintroduce exit referenda the four, count them, four times the measure shall need to be resurrected from the various measures which shall bury them three times. During these critical hours, allies in center left and center right shall be more valuable to the effort than gold.
As I said, this is a potential reality, but not necessarily the one which will become Germexit. And there are many microscopic steps I skipped over, here. But this was written because if you wish EU to cease, there is hope, but there will need to be far more persistence.